Do the
arguments at the beginning of Hegel�s Phenomenology of Spirit show that Hegel
has a distinctive and interesting view of the nature of consciousness and the
self?
Greg Detre
Saturday, February 24, 2001
Dr Rosen, post-Kantian VIII
Hegel intended the Phenomenology as an introduction to his system, and referred to it as such in his later Science of Logic and Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Indeed, he had made plans for the publication of a second edition before his death. However, he developed an increasingly critical attitude towards this project of a phenomenological introduction to the system, and adopted instead a discussion concerning three different �attitudes of thought to objectivity�.
The opening chapters of the Phenomenology can be seen as epistemological. They highlight the difficulty of forming a conception of oneself within the world that can be justified except by reference to reasons that themselves require justification.
The first chapter, on �Sense-certainty�, begins by discussing a form of consciousness that takes in only the most immediate aspects of experience, what we would now term �sense data�. Hegel considers that such a consciousness, if it could take in sensory information without processing it at all, would yield �immediate knowledge�, for whenever our conceptual net intervenes, it inevitably filters out certain things. When we describe a �brown�, �wooden� �table�, although this conception may be accurate, it is still lacking, and cannot be seen except as �mediated� and containing implicit concepts.
We might then think that the �concrete content of sense certainty� offers the richest, truest knowledge � but Hegel shows, with the dialectic, that in fact, it provides on the �abstractest and poorest truth�. Taylor regards Hegel as believing that being able to �say� is one of the �criterial properties of knowing�. Soll thinks that Taylor�s interpretation of Hegel misses the philosophical consequence of Hegel�s actual claim, since Taylor allows us to have described something adequately even if we �stumblingly� and �badly� attempt it with words like �ineffable�. But Soll argues convincingly that such a view would have been anathema to Hegel, who calls ineffability the �untrue� and �irrational�.
Taylor views the argument for the poverty of sense certainty as resting on its �refusal to be selective�. He points to the contradiction of a non-selective consciousness, that since consciousness is awareness, it cannot be anything but selective. Soll argues that Hegel is not discussing the selectivity of sense certainty yet, but rather the meagreness of its descriptions. The only thing that sense certainty can say about the object of its consciousness is that �it is�, it cannot describe the contents of consciousness as anything but �being�. Hegel is saying not so much that the contents of knowable consciousness reside in being able to say anything about it, as what you can say about it � and in the case of sense certainty, it is then a form of consciousness, but the poorest form.
Hegel then argues that sense certainty cannot be aware of particulars, but only of universals. He considers the words �this�, �now�, �here� and �I�, as universals � they fail to refer to particulars or individuals in a way that is independent of the context of their use. We all say �I think�, to refer to ourselves � it is a universal, rather than a particular �I�. Taylor takes the ensuing sections to be a discussion of ostensive definition, the means by which I might know the definitions of a sensation in order to have a criterion for applying a name. Soll argues that there is no textual evidence for such a discussion in Hegel, even though it does support his conclusions. Instead, Hegel appears to be pointing to a more elementary problem in our use of the term �now�, simply that the now will have already passed by the time we have pointed to it. The solution of saying that the present spans some tiny but finite period of time during which we might refer to it within it, changes the meaning of �now�. This is a dialectical development, and turns �now� into a universal, since it refers to an absolute group of �now�s all at once, a kind of conglomeration of instants. For Hegel, it is a question of assigning �now� some scope, rather than a specific scope which raises the problems of ostensive definition and boundaries that Taylor considers.
In order for Hegel to be able to generalise his critique of �now� as a univeral all the way to �this�, is to apply a similar procedure to �here�. But this is slightly more problematic than he seems to assume, because even if it takes a noticeable amount of time for us to point out a �here�, we have still succeeded in referring to a particular. The exact issues of referring in time are not the same as referring in space. However, there is some analogy, insofar as �here� admits of infinite subdivisions in the same way that �now� does, and can be regarded as a �plurality� of �here�s. In this sense, �here� is a universal too, and so �this� must be too.
This leaves Hegel open to one last major criticism: his lack of distinction between universal and whole. As Soll rightly points out, to demonstrate that time and space are infinitely subdividable does not in itself show that a region of time or space cannot be a particular comprised of (an infinite number of) parts. Indeed, it is upon this criticism that his major point stands. When Hegel refers to �here� and �now� as universals, he is not so much making a statement about our ability to express them only as universals, but about their status as such. It is in this way that he attacks sense certainty, as misdirectedly trying to appeal to universals as particulars.
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Hegel moves to show that the resulting understanding, that of consciousness as having a universal (conceptual) aspect, gives rise to what he terms �perception�, where the universality of the contents of consciousness must be publicly apprehensible. But this in turn generates contradictions that are irresolvable by conventional means, setting the stage for Hegel�s �speculative� philosophical reasoning by dialectic. Otherwise, we are mired in a series of �formations of consciousness� � this is Hegel�s term for a world-view that is based on assumptions, i.e. �appearances� � and no single �formation of consciousness� can be objectively any more valid than any other.
In a literary way, the Phenomenology is almost trying to historicise (in the Hegelian sense) a consciousness�s attempt at understanding itself. As each �formation of consciousness� replaces the one before, we are moving towards the triumphal conclusion.
Most of the Phenomenology is about social or ethical issues, so it seems curious that it opens with an epistemological discussion. But Hegel regarded this as essential, since all of his works are intended to be self-justifying. His intention is to move from subjective spirit to objective spirit, so that he could proceed to the exposition of his Sittlichkeit. In order to become objective, consciousness must become self-conscious, since it �requires the conscious subject to be aware of itself as a subject for whom something other, an object, is presented as something known� (Redding, Stanford). This marks the shift towards patterns of mutual recognition of consciousness, and those around us.
The Phenomenology could be seen as attempting two things:
Hegel�s system can be seen as serving two purposes to the modern reader. On the one hand, it highlights many of the internal conflicts within 18th century materialism, mainly along the lines of the subjective/objective divide, some of which are still major issues. It also provides a resolution for these conflicts, in a powerful and novel way. By treating the self and the world as identical, as Geist, the problem breaks down entirely. Hegel�s idealism is far purer and more coherent than, say, Berkeley�s, in that it requires no sub-division into �spirits� and �ideas�. Rather, it is wholly monist in seeing the entire world as Geist, as intelligible self-conscious structure. The identities Hegel requires to found his system seem strained, but if accepted, ensure that it coheres in a very satisfying way.
We can see his discussion of sense-certainty in the Phenomenology as a microcosm of his larger systematic effort to release oneself from the �finitude of reflection� by means of the dialectic. The Phenomenology is based on his conviction that all of a consciousness�s epistemic attitudes towards a material world can be seen as relations between �cognition� and �truth�. �Knowledge� is that epistemic relation when �cognition� (subject) and �truth� (object) correspond with each other, which for Hegel requires them to be identical. In order for this to be the case, neither cognition nor truth can be formulated in an internally inconsistent manner. Given all this, knowledge can really only be seen as self-knowledge.